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Abstract
We analyze collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions by European banks
(1997 - 2004), trying to identify ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic factors inﬂuencing an
institution’s securitization decision. CLO issuance seems to be an appropriate funding
tool for large banks with high risk and low liquidity. However, risk transfer turns out
to be limited in the extremes. Controlling for ﬁxed eﬀects, we ﬁnd that ﬁxed costs of
securitization are surmountable also for smaller institutions. Interestingly, commercial
banks seem to use loan securitization to access capital-market based businesses and
the associated fee income. Regulatory capital arbitrage does not appear to have driven
the market.
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furt am Main, Germany.Non–technical summary 
Despite the recent dramatic growth in the market for credit risk, it is as to yet not entirely 
clear why banks engage in securitizing their loans. While securitization may help to increase 
liquidity, augment fee income, reduce credit and interest rate risk and improve leverage ratios, 
many financial institutions still choose not to securitize any of their loans. Among the 
disadvantages of loan securitization, a reduction in the tax benefits of ''on balance sheet'' debt 
and the fixed costs of setting up a securitization program are frequently mentioned. Also, 
regulatory capital arbitrage was suspected to be one of the main drivers of credit risk transfer 
in the early years. Still, we observe that recent growth in credit risk transfer (CRT) activity 
did not deteriorate despite the introduction of the new regulatory environment of Basel II that 
will no longer allow for regulatory capital relief via loan securitization.
In our study, we analyze collateralized loan obligation (CLO) transactions by 
European banks between 1997 and 2004 and try to find an answer to the question which 
factors drive a financial institution's decision to securitize loans. While we cannot fully reject 
an influence of banks' incentives to reduce regulatory capital, securitization activity seems to 
be strongly affected by firm-specific characteristics. As might have been expected, the 
probability of a bank engaging in loan securitization is found to increase in bank size and to 
decrease along with the bank's liquidity. Additionally, we observe that banks are more likely 
to securitize loans the higher the banks' expected credit risk. Securitization hence seems to be 
used as a risk-transfer tool. However, risk-transfer turns out to be limited, since banks with 
highest risk are found to reduce their securitization activity along with higher credit risk. For 
the sub-sample of stock-listed banks, even stronger effects are observed with respect to size, 
risk, liquidity and performance. We also find a significant ”reverse'' regulatory arbitrage 
effect: banks with low tier 1 capital securitize significantly less than banks with high tier 1 
capital. The new regulatory framework of Basel II should therefore not be expected to hamper 
the future growth of CRT markets. Interestingly, when we control for identical banks entering 
the database repeatedly, bank size hardly matters for the securitization decision. Obviously, 
the fixed costs of setting up a securitization program are surmountable also for smaller 
banking institutions. Particularly for commercial banks this leads us to suspect that loan 
securitization is also used in order to indirectly access investment-banking related activities 
and the associated fee income.  Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Trotz des rasanten Wachstums des Marktes für Kreditrisikotransfer sind die Motive der 
Banken für die Verbriefung von Kreditportfolios noch nicht vollständig geklärt. 
Kreditverbriefungen führen zwar zu höherer Liquidität, einer Reduktion von Kredit- und 
Zinsrisiken, einer Steigerung von  Provisionseinkommen, möglicherweise auch einer 
Verbesserung der Kapitalstruktur, jedoch entscheiden sich einige Banken trotzdem gegen eine 
Strukturierung und Weiterreichung ihrer Kreditportfolios. Unter den Nachteilen der 
Verbriefung werden unter anderem die relativ hohen fixen Kosten der erstmaligen Errichtung 
einer Verbriefungsstruktur sowie eventuelle Steuernachteile von nicht auf der Bilanz 
gehaltenen Krediten genannt. Weiterhin ermöglicht das neue Basel-II Regelwerk keine 
„Arbitrage regulatorischen Eigenkapitals“ via Kreditverbriefung mehr, anders als die weniger 
risikosensitive Eigenkapitalunterlegung unter den alten Basel-Richtlinien.
Unsere Studie analysiert „Collateralized Loan Obligation“ (CLO) Transaktionen von 
Europäischen Banken in den Jahren 1997-2004. Ziel ist es, Faktoren zu isolieren, die die 
Entscheidung einer Bank, Kredite zu verbriefen,  beeinflusst haben. Während wir einen 
Einfluss regulatorischer Arbitrage nicht vollkommen ausschließen können, zeigt unsere 
Studie, dass die wesentlichen Bestimmungsfaktoren vielmehr individuelle Faktoren der 
Banken sind. So ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass eine Bank Kredite verbrieft, umso höher, je 
größer die Bank, je geringer ihre Liquidität und je höher ihr erwartetes Kreditrisiko ist. 
Kreditverbriefungen werden offensichtlich als Möglichkeit des Kreditrisikotransfers genutzt. 
Allerdings zeigt sich, dass Banken mit dem höchsten Kreditrisiko ihre Verbriefungsaktivitäten 
mit zunehmendem Risiko einstellen, so dass die Risikotransferfunktion nur begrenzt zu 
nutzen zu sein scheint. Für am Aktienmarkt notierte Banken treffen obige Aussagen noch 
stärker zu. Interessanterweise zeigt sich hier sogar ein „negativer“ regulatorischer 
Arbitrageeffekt: Banken mit niedrigem regulatorischem Eigenkapital verbriefen weniger 
Kredite als Banken mit höherem Eigenkapital. Die neuen Eigenkapitalrichtlinien nach Basel 
II sollten daher das zukünftige Wachstum des Kreditrisikotransfermarktes nicht 
beeinträchtigen. Bemerkenswerterweise scheint auch die Bankengröße eine weniger wichtige 
Rolle zu spielen als zunächst gedacht. Auch kleinere Banken sind somit in der Lage, die mit 
einer Kreditverbriefung verbundenen Fixkosten zu tragen. Es ist zu vermuten, dass gerade 
traditionelle Kreditbanken die Verbriefung von Kreditportfolios unter anderem auch nutzen, 
um indirekt dem „investment-banking“ verwandte Geschäftsbereiche und die entsprechenden 
Provisionseinkommen zu erschließen. 1 Introduction
Even though credit risk transfer (CRT) activity has a long history, a market for credit
derivative transactions did not develop before the late 1970s.1 Since then, CRT activity has
been growing at a rapid rate. Recent years have been characterized by signiﬁcant product
innovation, an increasing number of market participants and growth in overall transaction
volume. The notional amount of credit derivatives outstanding increased from EUR 690
billion at the end of June 2001 to EUR 5,792 billion by the end of December 2005 and is
projected to exceed EUR 30,000 billion in 2008 (British Bankers’ Association). Between
2000 and 2006 European securitization issuance rose from EUR 78.2 billion to EUR 458.9
billion, paralleling the even more developed US market for asset-backed securities (ABS)
that exceeded USD 1,200 billion in 2006.2 Among the diﬀerent issuances by collateral type,
the sector of collateralized debt obligations (CDO) with EUR 88 billion was the second
largest in 2006, accounting for 19 percent of the securitized market in Europe. It was also
growing at the fastest rate (up about 80 percent from EUR 48.9 billion one year earlier).
Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) were the leading collateral sector within the CDO
market. The market of other ABS securities - commercial mortgage backed securities,
credit card receivables, leases, auto loans and receivables - increased to EUR 370 billion in
the year 2006. UK securitization totaled EUR 192 billion, representing over 50 percent of
all European securitized debt in 2006. Volumes also grew across the other leading countries
of collateral - Spain, Netherlands, Italy, Germany, and France.3
Despite the dramatic growth in the market for credit risk, it is as to yet not entirely clear
why banks engage in securitizing their loans. While securitization may help to increase
liquidity, augment fee income, reduce credit and interest rate risk and improve leverage
ratios, many ﬁnancial institutions still choose not to securitize any of their loans (Ambrose
et al., 2003). Among the disadvantages of loan securitization, a reduction in the tax beneﬁts
of “on balance sheet” debt and the ﬁxed costs of setting up a securitization program
are frequently mentioned (Minton et al., 2004). Also, regulatory capital arbitrage was
suspected to be one of the main drivers of credit risk transfer in the early years (Duﬃe and
Garleanu, 2001; Calomiris and Mason, 2004). Still, we observe that recent growth in CRT
activity did not deteriorate despite the introduction of the new regulatory environment of
Basel II that will no longer allow for regulatory capital relief via loan securitization.
In this paper, we try to ﬁnd an answer to the question which factors drive a ﬁnancial
institution’s decision to securitize loans. Our research focus is similar to the one taken by
Minton et al. (2004). They test two hypotheses regarding the use of loan securitization:
regulatory capital arbitrage versus eﬃcient ﬁnancial contracting. Regulatory capital arbi-
trage stems from regulatory distortions in bank capital requirements: in order to save on
required regulatory capital under the Basel Capital Accord of 1988, banks may attempt
to securitize low-risk assets and hold high-risk assets. The eﬃcient-contracting hypoth-
esis, in contrast, promotes securitization as a ﬁnancial engineering product that allows
to access debt ﬁnancing without bearing costs of ﬁnancial distress (Gorton and Souleles,
1In the mid-1970s, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) developed mortgage pass-
throughs. First Boston introduced asset-backed securities in 1985 (Lockwood et al., 2006).
2In the US, the ABS market represents almost one third of the total corporate bond market.
3Source: Thomson Financial Securities Data, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), European Se-
curitisation Forum and Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).
12006). Minton et al. (2004) ﬁnd support for the latter argument but not for the regulatory
arbitrage hypothesis. In particular, they suggest that unregulated ﬁnancial institutions
are more likely to securitize, as - due to their lack of regulatory safety net - they typically
bear the costs of ﬁnancial distress. However, in their sample on US private-sector ﬁnancial
companies, the fraction of ﬁnancial ﬁrms securitizing assets is very small: it rises from 2
percent in 1993 to less than 4 percent in 2002. Their results may therefore be strongly
driven by the characteristics of large banks which were the ﬁrst to adopt securitization
activities. In our sample on European ﬁnancial institutions, in contrast, the proportion
of securitizing ﬁrms increases from 1.6 percent in 1997 to 27 percent in 2004. Yet, as we
do not obtain information on regulatory capital for all banks, we put more emphasis on a
detailed test of the eﬃcient-contracting explanation. In this respect, we analyze diﬀerent
ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables that may have an impact on the eﬃciency of
the securitization instrument with regard to reducing ﬁnancial distress costs and therefore
inﬂuence banks’ engagement in that market.
Summarizing our results, we ﬁnd that while we cannot fully reject an inﬂuence of
banks’ incentives to reduce regulatory capital, securitization activity seems to be strongly
aﬀected by ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. As might have been expected, the probability of
a bank engaging in loan securitization is found to increase in bank size and to decrease
along with the bank’s liquidity. These results are in line with earlier work by Dionne and
Harchaoui (2003), Minton et al. (2004) and Uzun and Webb (2006). Additionally, we
observe that banks are more likely to securitize loans the higher the banks’ expected credit
risk. Securitization hence seems to be used as a risk-tranfer tool. However, risk-transfer
turns out to be limited, since banks in the highest credit risk decile are found to reduce
their securitization activity along with higher credit risk. Interestingly, the “quality” of the
banks’ risk (approximated by gross interest income divided by gross outstanding accounts)
tends to inﬂuence the issuing decision positively. This may be taken as a sign of banks’
“risk-appetite”, leading them to originate a large amount of high-quality loans that may
be oﬄoaded via a CLO issuance lateron in order to take on new business.4 Yet, we also
ﬁnd that well-performing institutions securitize less than banks with low performance.
This runs slightly counter to the risk-appetite argument. Among macroeconomic factors,
long-term interest rates and yield spreads are found to aﬀect CLO issuances.
For the sub-sample of stock-listed banks, even stronger eﬀects are observed with respect
to size, risk, liquidity and performance. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcant “reverse” regulatory
arbitrage eﬀect: banks with low tier 1 capital securitize signiﬁcantly less than banks with
high tier 1 capital. The new regulatory framework of Basel II should therefore not be
expected to hamper the future growth of CRT markets. Yet, the combination of high
credit risk and low equity seems to aﬀect securitization decisions strongly positively. We
are therefore not able to fully reject the inﬂuence of regulatory capital considerations.
Interestingly, when we control for ﬁxed eﬀects within our sample, i.e. identifying identi-
cal banks entering the database repeatedly, bank size hardly matters for the securitization
decision. Obviously, the ﬁxed costs of setting up a securitization program are surmount-
able also for smaller banking institutions. Particularly for commercial banks this leads us
to suspect that loan securitization is used in order to indirectly access investment-banking
related activities and the associated fee income. This conjecture is strengthened by the
4The fact that not all ﬁnancial institutions in our sample used a CLO for a true-sale but instead acted
simply as an intermediary buying and selling securitized portfolios even strengthens this interpretation.
2ﬁnding that banks with low ratio of fees and commissions over interest revenue are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to securitize. We also observe a negative inﬂuence of tax considerations
and a positive eﬀect of the market-to-book ratio for stock-listed banks.
Our work complements several recent empirical and few theoretical papers on the role
of credit securitization. One large strand of the literature focuses on the question of how
banks’ systematic risk develops in response to issuing asset-backed securities. These papers
tend to agree on two fundamental facts. First, the aggregate amount of risk transfer that
has been observed so far is small relative to the issuers’ overall exposures and also relative to
the notional size of the market (Minton et al., 2005). Second, CRT activity is a key part of
the ongoing transformation of credit markets (Franke and Krahnen, 2006) and is expected
to grow further in the following years. Several studies hence conclude that systemic risk
on ﬁnancial markets may be expected to increase due to credit securitization (Krahnen
and Wilde, 2007). A second strand of the literature examines the eﬀect of securitization
on banks’ lending behavior. These papers typically ﬁnd that the separation of origination
and funding of credit from holding and managing credit risk tends to increase the supply of
loans (Loutskina and Strahan, 2006; Hirtle, 2007). The weakened link from bank funding
conditions to credit supply is projected to loosen monetary policy’s real eﬀects and may
also increase banks’ overall risk taking (H¨ ansel and Krahnen, 2007; Instefjord, 2005).
Against the background of this recent literature, our paper contributes to an explana-
tion of the origin of credit securitization. In this respect, our work amends further studies
such as by Ambrose et al. (2006), who test whether asymmetric information about the
borrowers has driven the market for credit securitization, or Franke et al. (2007), who
analyze the inﬂuence of issuer characteristics on the speciﬁc design of CDOs. Jiangli et al.
(2007) additionally link an empirical study of loan securitization with a theoretical model
of banks’ capital structure decisions and the ensuing moral hazard problems. Their results
on US ﬁnancial institutions support our ﬁndings with respect to European banks that risk
transfer seems to be the main motivating factor, leading to a “ﬁne tuning” of performance
via securitization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview
on the securitization process and the main motivating factors inﬂuencing banks’ decision
to securitize their loans. Section 3 delineates the bank sample data and the empirical
methodology used to test the variables’ inﬂuence on banks’ decisions. The subsequent
section describes the variables and hypotheses. Section 5 presents the results of univariate
and multivariate tests that are discussed in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Motivation for securitization transactions
The increasing depth of secondary markets for credit risk in the last few years opened
up a new way for ﬁnancial institutions to separate the origination and funding of credit
from the management of associated risks. The strong increase in the cumulative volume
of asset-backed securities is often attributed to three main motivating factors: regulatory
capital relief, reduction in ﬁnancial distress costs and “risk-appetite”. Before we turn to
these diﬀerent arguments, we will brieﬂy sketch the construction of instruments.
Generally, the CRT market consists of two major product categories: credit default
3swaps (CDS) and CDOs. In a CDS, the investor buys the credit risk associated with a
speciﬁc reference entity for a ﬁxed time in exchange for a fee. The issuer in essence obtains
an insurance against loan default. Within the class of CDOs, cash and synthetic CDOs may
be distinguished.5 In a cash CDO, the originator pools a portfolio of bonds or loans and
sells this to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). This separate legal entity issues securities that
are collateralized by the bonds. In a synthetic CDO, in contrast, the bank that originates
the loans does not actually transfer ownership of the loans; instead, the risk of the portfolio
is transmitted through credit derivatives to the SPV. In both cases, a portfolio of credit
risk exposures is pooled, segmented into tranches with diﬀerent seniority and transferred to
investors.6 The tranches display speciﬁc risk-return characteristics and obey the principle
of strict subordination, i.e. holders of the lowest tranche (equity tranche or ﬁrst loss piece,
FLP7) absorb all losses up to the par value of this tranche. If accumulated losses of the
portfolio exceed this par value, the next senior tranche will absorb the remaining losses
and so forth. Payments therefore follow a waterfall structure through the diﬀerent (senior,
mezzanine and equity) tranches and the FLP bears most of the risk contained in the
underlying portfolio.8
Particularly in the early years of the CRT market, banks cited their interest in reducing
regulatory capital as the main motivation for issuing CLOs (Duﬃe and Garleanu, 2001;
Calomiris and Mason, 2004). International regulation in the Basel Capital Accord im-
plemented in 1992 uses the capital-asset ratio to ensure that banks hold suﬃcient capital
buﬀer to bear default losses. In general, loan pools require regulatory capital of 8 percent
of the reference pool’s assets. In order to save on regulatory capital, banks may therefore
try to remove low-risk assets from their balance sheets and retain high-risk assets. As the
required capital is the same, the cost of holding low-risk assets is greater since the incre-
mental capital is not economically justiﬁable (Ambrose et al., 2003). While the incentives
to use regulatory capital arbitrage will shrink under the new framework of Basel II that
uses risk-sensitive capital ratios, it may have contributed to the increase in securitization
in the early years (Minton et al. 2004).
From the investors’ point of view, CDOs generally help to overcome the illiquidity of
bonds and loans that stem from market imperfections based on information asymmetries
(DeMarzo, 2005). These are a major obstacle to trading debt claims, in particular with
regard to claims against small and less well-known debtors (Franke and Krahnen, 2006).
As market imperfections of this type are similar to those in the insurance business, pro-
tection mechanisms are applied in CDO transactions in the same vein. In particular, the
creation and retainment of FLP by the issuer are an important tool to overcome problems
of adverse selection and moral hazard. By retaining the FLP, the tranche that is most
susceptible to default, the expected default risk of the securitized portfolio remains largely
5Recent years have seen a large proportion of German securitizations as synthetic CDOs, whereas in
Spain most securitization transactions involve a “true sale” as in a cash security.
6For more detailed information on the design of the issued securities and the question why tranching
may be beneﬁcial to investors, see also Firla-Cuchra and Jenkinson (2005), De Marzo (2005) and Plantin
(2004).
7The FLP is not fully equivalent to the actual ﬁrst loss position if the originator implements credit
enhancements in the structure which are subordinated to the FLP. For a detailed description of diﬀerent
types of credit enhancements see Jobst (2002).
8For a more detailed description, in particular with respect to credit enhancements underlying the
waterfall structure of CDOs, see Hein (2007).
4on the balance sheet of the issuing bank and so do monitoring incentives that reduce in-
formation asymmetries.9 At the same time, by selling mezzanine and senior tranches, the
risk of unexpected losses is transferred from the originator to investors at full compensa-
tion and, moreover, is more strongly diversiﬁed on the market (Krahnen, 2005; Krahnen
and Wilde, 2005; BIS, 2005b). ABS-transactions are therefore claimed to allow a more
eﬃcient economic risk sharing between issuer and investors, allowing the direct funding of
information sensitive assets via the capital markets (DeMarzo, 2005). According to this
argument, loan securitization helps to reduce ﬁnancial distress costs.
Apart from this risk sharing argument directly related to eﬃcient contracting, several
other aspects have been mentioned that may aﬀect a ﬁnancial institution’s decision to
securitize loans. Most prominent is the liquidity eﬀect of securitization transactions that
is particularly obvious in cash transactions. Here, the transfer of assets follows a true
sale (“oﬀ-balance sheet”) of the underlying portfolio to an SPV. The SPV then issues
notes in order to fund the assets purchased from the originating bank. Obviously, this
transaction leads to an inﬂow of cash and hence a possible restructuring of the bank’s
balance sheet (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995), contingent on the reallocation of cash by the
originator. With respect to this latter argument it is interesting to note that the funding
costs involved with a securitization transaction are mainly related to the credit quality of
the underlying portfolio and not to the rating of the originating bank (Krahnen, 2005).
This also contributes to the marketability of these instruments since investors do not have
to invest in additional research on the issuer but focus solely on the quality of underlying
loans.10
Additional factors may have an important inﬂuence on a ﬁnancial institution’s decision
to engage in credit securitization. As setting up a securitization program leads to signif-
icant ﬁxed costs, we should expect only relatively large banks to securitize their loans.11
The likelihood of a ﬁnancial institution being active in CRT markets may also depend on
the bank type (Minton et al., 2005) - particularly against the background of the ongoing
transformation of traditional banking services towards market-based solutions (disinterme-
diation).
Banks may also hope to trigger signiﬁcant eﬀects on their market equity value. Ayotte
and Gaon (2006) show that the structural design of true sale ABS-transactions may have
a valuable eﬀect for weak originators in debtor-friendly bankruptcy regimes such as in
the US. Here, weak banks have strong incentives towards activities in the securitization
market as this may help to reduce ineﬃcient continuation and is rewarded as such by the
market. Lockwood et al. (1996), in contrast, ﬁnd that wealth eﬀects of securitization
transactions are signiﬁcantly related to ﬁnancial slack of the bank in the quarter preceding
the securitization announcement. In their study, ﬁnancial slack is a proxy for the quality
or performance of the bank. Findings are therefore quality speciﬁc, with wealth increases
9Arrow (1971), Townsend (1979) or Gale and Hellwig (1985) give a detailed analysis of incentive eﬀects
based on securitized claims.
10However, there remains some linkage to the originator’s rating, if the SPV also enters into a servicer
agreement with the originating bank. In such cases, investors and rating agencies will have to evaluate the
servicer risk inherent in the transaction.
11Note that in several countries, publicly-sponsored programs exist to promote asset securitization by
setting up a platform to be used by several (smaller) ﬁnancial institutions, thereby making use of economies
of scale. In Germany, for instance, the TSI (True Sale Initiative) is active in coordinating speciﬁc securiti-
zation programs.
5for strong banks and wealth losses for weak banks. The authors argue that a securitization
transaction by a weak bank results in a negative signal to the capital market in the sense
of Myers and Majluf (1994), while strong banks will only engage in the securitization
market when they are able to extract a positive net present value from the transaction.
Thus, strong banks have a higher incentive to securitize. This result is strengthened by
the study of Thomas (2001), who, in a cross-section regression of cumulative abnormal
returns, reports that the ﬁrst entry of a successful originator in the securitization market
is associated with signiﬁcant gains.
H¨ ansel and Krahnen (2007) furthermore show that credit securitization tends to in-
crease the systematic risk of the issuing bank. In a cross-sectional analysis they reveal
that the issuer’s equity beta rises signiﬁcantly more if the bank is ﬁnancially weak and
is domiciled in a bank-based ﬁnancial system. Furthermore, the initial systematic risk
of the originator is found to have a signiﬁcant impact on the change in systematic risk.
H¨ ansel and Krahnen (2007) argue that this may be interpreted as banks’ “appetite for
risk”, leading them to increase their exposure to market risk via loan securitization.
Apart from aspects of equity capital, credit risk and liquidity, further motivation for a
bank’s decision to be active in the market for loan securitization may therefore come from
the bank’s performance, its systematic risk, its size and bank type. The following empirical
study will scrutinize the impact that these variables and more general macroeconomic
factors may have on ﬁnancial institutions’ willingness to engage in loan securitization.12
3 Methodology and data
3.1 Sample
Our sample comprises all European banks in Bankscope for the period from January 1997
to December 2004 that satisfy two criteria. First, total bank assets must exceed Euro 150
million and second, the number of loans on each bank’s balance sheet must be larger than
800 million. We hence concentrate on relatively large banks,13 drop all central banks and
thus arrive at a ﬁnal sample of 316 banks that comply with both criteria for at least one
year.
Table 1 reports the number of banks for each year in our sample and their country-
speciﬁc aﬃliation. The ﬁnal sample consists of 1948 bank entries with an average of 243
banks per year, ranging from a minimum of 226 banks in 2004 to a maximum of 257 in
1997. Due to massive concentration processes in the banking sector, our sample parallels
the generally-observed decrease in the number of banks per year. Overall, our sample
comprises banks from 17 diﬀerent countries. The main part of our sample (about 60%) is
made up of ﬁnancial institutions from Germany, France, UK and Italy.
Table 2 reports the classiﬁcation of banks with regard to diﬀerent business areas (taken
from the Bankscope database). Commercial banks consistently make up slightly over 40
12Note that since we do not dispose of information on the speciﬁc characteristics of banks’ loans, we
cannot test more elaborate hypotheses on risk transfer based on information asymmetries in the sense of
Duﬃe and Zhou (2001).
13As the securitization decision is known to depend strongly on bank size, we limit potential endogeneity
problems by focussing on a sample that is not too heterogeneous with respect to the size variable.
6Table 1: Sample summary statistics: bank origin
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Country
Belgium 14 12 888888
Denmark 8 9 10 10 7 7 6 6
Germany 64 58 59 60 55 56 54 55
France 33 31 35 34 36 36 34 32
UK 33 35 36 36 35 35 33 33
Ireland 4 6667777
Italy 31 28 27 27 28 23 23 22




Switzerland 10 8 8 8 8 9 10 9
Spain 18 17 15 14 14 14 14 14
Other 13 13 13 14 15 14 13 10
N 257 247 250 250 244 241 233 226
percent of the ﬁnal sample and as such account for the largest fraction. Real estate banks,
bank holdings and cooperative banks together roughly account for another 40 percent.
Note that while the number of commercial banks in our sample has been slightly decreasing
over the years (from 118 in 1997 to 95 in 2004), the number of real estate banks, bank
holdings and cooperative banks has remained constant or even slightly increasing until 2000
and decreasing only afterwards. The number of other ﬁnancial institutions has remained
relatively stable. Investment banks make up only a very small fraction of less than 4
percent.
3.2 Measures of securitization
Data for individual issuances of securitization transactions stem from three diﬀerent sources.
First, we use the European Securitization Almanac (January, July, October 2004 and
February 2005) by Deutsche Bank. Second, we control each originator’s securitization
activities with the Quarterly CDO Deal List (September 2005) by Standard and Poor’s.
Finally, we also use the European Securitization Deal List (March 2006) by Computershare
Fixed Income Services Limited. All banks without issuance activities in the securitization
market are cross-checked with Lexis/Nexis Database.
Table 3 reports the percentage of ﬁrms that securitized assets for any given year in
our sample period. Panel A sorts the results by year and country of the originating bank,
while panel B sorts the results by the originator’s type (business area). Panel C ﬁnally
accounts only for stock-listed banks, as a subsample of the total data set. The fraction of
7Table 2: Sample summary statistics: main bank business areas
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Bank Type
Bank Holding 28 29 31 33 32 34 29 28
Commercial Bank 118 111 110 106 104 101 100 95
Cooperative Bank 21 20 21 24 24 22 23 21
Investment Bank 9 10 10 9 9 9 9 9
Medium / Long Term Credit Bank 7 6 6 6 6 6 5 5
Non-banking Credit Institution 8 7 9 9 10 10 10 10
Real Estate / Mortgage Bank 33 32 32 33 29 27 26 26
Savings Bank 17 16 15 14 13 14 16 16
Governmental Credit Institution 16 16 16 16 16 18 15 16
N 257 247 250 250 244 241 233 226
ﬁnancial institutions securitizing assets increases from 1.6 percent in 1997 to 27 percent
in 2004. The largest fraction of securitization transactions is undertaken by banks with
headquarters in Germany and the UK. In recent years, also banks in Spain have been active
in securitization processes. As can be seen from panel B, most transactions are initiated
by commercial banks, to a much lesser extent also by mortgage banks, savings banks and
investment banks. Table 3 also shows that the percentage of stock-quoted ﬁnancial ﬁrms
securitizing assets has increased. Yet, while in the ﬁrst years of our sample (1997-2001),
stock-listed institutions accounted for more than 50% of all CLO issuances, recent years
have seen a signiﬁcant decrease of this proportion to less than 40%. At the same time, the
proportion of stock-listed banks in the full sample has increased from 26% to 36%.
3.3 Methodology
Our empirical approach is two-fold. In a ﬁrst step, we divide the sample of banks into a
group of securitizing banks and into a group not issuing securitized loans. In a univari-
ate analysis, we then test for diﬀerences in means of various bank characteristics. The
subsequent multivariate approach analyzes how ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables
inﬂuence securitization behavior in a logit framework.14 With simultaneous consideration
of the diﬀerent data sources we check for each year whether or not a bank in our data set
securitized assets. Whenever there is at least one securitization transaction by the bank,
the dependent variable in our regression takes on the value 1, otherwise, i.e. if there is no
securitization activity, it takes on the value 0.
Within a limited dependent variable model, we adopt a speciﬁcation that is designed to
handle the requirements of binary dependent variables, where the probability of observing
a value of one is given by
14Probit analyses are available upon request. They deliver the same qualitative results.
8Table 3: Summary of securitization activities by ﬁnancial entities
Frequency of CLO issuance by sample banks; Overall indicates number of banks, N number
of banks which issue a CLO-transaction.
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Panel A: CLO issuance by year and country
Overall 257 247 250 250 244 241 233 226
N 47 2 2 4 34 55 95 96 1
Percentage of sample 1.6% 2.8% 8.8% 17.2% 18.4% 24.5% 25.3% 27.0%
Belgium 1 1 0 12222
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0001
Germany 0151 01 11 51 21 4
France 0 0 2 43668
Great Britain 0251 0 6 1 01 21 2
Ireland 1 0 0 20100
Italy 0 0 2 4 10 6 5 3
Netherlands 2 1 2 4 3 4 5 5
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Portugal 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
Sweden 0 0 0 00000
Switzerland 0 0 1 33233
Spain 0 1 4 4 5 9 11 9
Other countries 0 0 0 00112
Panel B: CLO issuance by type of ﬁrm
Bank Holding 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 2
Commercial Bank 3 6 13 31 29 38 38 37
Cooperative Bank 1 0 0 1 5 2 3 3
Investment Bank 0 0 1 21345
Medium / Long Term Credit Bank 0 0 1 10101
Non-banking Credit Institution 0 0 0 00001
Real Estate / Mortgage Bank 0 1 3 64856
Savings Bank 0 0 3 12464
Governmental Credit Inst. 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2
Panel C: Subsample of stock-listed banks
Quoted on the stock exchange 67 71 74 80 81 83 84 82
Percentage of total sample 26.1 28.7 29.6 32 33.2 34.4 36.1 36.3
Number of issuances by quoted banks 2 5 13 22 25 25 24 24
Percentage of sub-sample 3.0 7.0 17.6 27.2 30.5 30.1 28.6 29.3
Percentage of all issuing banks 50.0 71.4 59.1 51.2 55.6 42.4 40.7 39.3
9Pr(yi =1| xi)=1− F(−x 
iβ). (1)
Here, F is a continuous, strictly increasing function that takes on real values and returns
a value ranging form zero to one. By choosing a logit function for F, it follows that
Pr(yi =0| xi)=F(−x 
iβ). (2)
Given such a speciﬁcation, we can estimate the model parameters by using the method













The ﬁrst-order conditions for this likelihood are nonlinear, so that obtaining parameter
estimates requires an iterative solution. By default, our statistical program uses a second
derivative method for iteration and computation of the covariance matrix for parameter
estimates. Note that estimated coeﬃcients from a binary model cannot be interpreted as
the marginal eﬀect of the independent on the dependent variable. Logit coeﬃcients are,
however, considered as the marginal eﬀect of xi on the log of the “odds”, where:
“odds” =
Pr(yi =1 |xi)
1 − Pr(yi =1 |xi)
. (4)
Note that our sample consists of yearly securitization decisions of European banks.
Some of them chose to securitize their loans only once, while others continually decided to
issue securitized assets. Our empirical approach accounts for this by clustering standard
errors by banks following the generalized method based on Huber-White.
4 Deﬁnition of variables and descriptive statistics
4.1 Hypotheses and deﬁnition of variables
Generally, we test whether diﬀerent ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables have an
inﬂuence on the probability of a CLO-transaction by banks, i.e.
dependent variable = f(originator-speciﬁc variables, macroeconomic variables) .
To avoid potential problems of endogeneity, all right-hand-side variables enter the regres-
sion equations lagged by one period.
Among the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, diﬀerent factors are included, based on the arguments
presented in section 2. As the main regressors we consider the originator’s credit risk,
leverage, performance and liquidity. In the following, we will describe each explanatory
variable and its expected inﬂuence on the regressand in turn. A deﬁnition of variables and
10a summary of expected regressor signs is given in table 4.
With respect to the regulatory capital relief hypothesis we include two proxies for the
equity situation of the originator. Tier 1, describing the ratio of tier 1 capital relative to
risk weighted assets, and equity share are both expected to exhibit a negative inﬂuence on
a bank’s propensity to issue CLOs: according to the regulatory capital relief hypothesis,
banks with lower capital ratios should be more likely to securitize assets. This eﬀect should
be strongest for banks with capital ratios near the regulatory required minimum. In order
to take account of this, we generate a dummy variable (low tier 1) that is equal to one for
the ten percent of banks with the lowest capital ratios and zero otherwise.15 We expect a
positive sign for this dummy variable. To be consistent, we also test whether tier 1 capital
has an eﬀect among the subgroup of banks with lowest capital ratios via the interaction
term low tier 1 * tier 1. For stock-listed banks, we additionally examine whether there is
a signiﬁcant eﬀect for the group of banks with highest credit risk and lowest equity (high
risk * low tier 1). A positive sign of this dummy should indicate that in particular banks
with problems in fulﬁlling the regulatory constraints choose to securitize their loans.
The variable risk in our data set is supposed to reﬂect the originator’s credit risk
situation by measuring the bank’s credit risk provision relative to net interest income.
Since loan securitization allows a risk transfer of the underlying portfolio to the capital
market, we should assume that ﬁrms with higher asset risk will have a higher incentive
to securitize. There may be two reasons for this particular eﬀect, though: ﬁrst, banks
may have a certain “appetite for risk” in order to increase expected returns. Those banks
may be heavily engaged in securitization in order to, e.g., set free capital that can be
invested in other risky businesses delivering higher expected returns. Second, banks that
“unvoluntarily” bear a lot of risk and hence face a high likelihood of ﬁnancial distress may
try to fund their lending activities by securitization rather than by holding the assets on
balance sheet and funding them with debt and equity. In particular for this latter group
of banks we expect that the eﬀect should be strongest for ﬁrms with highest risk. To test
this, we introduce a dummy variable (high risk) that is equal to one for the ten percent of
banks with highest risk and zero otherwise. Additionally, we test whether the risk variable
has an inﬂuence on this subgroup (via the additional regressor high risk * risk).
In order to capture the “appetite-for-risk” hypothesis, we also tested the inﬂuence of
the quality of risk. This variable describes the ratio of the ﬁrm’s gross interest income
to gross outstanding accounts. The quality variable hence refers to an ex-ante notion of
risk that should better correspond to banks’ incentives to increase risk-taking in order to
generate higher expected returns than the simple risk measure mentioned above. According
to the above reasoning, the quality variable should be expected to have a positive eﬀect on
a bank’s propensity to engage in securitization activities. Still, we cannot rule out the case
that the quality variable also acts as a (negative) proxy for “weak” banks that generate
low interest income. In this case, the eﬀect should be negative, since according to the
ﬁrst channel mentioned above, weak banks also have greater incentives to be active in the
securitization market.
Furthermore we include a proxy for the liquidity of the originator. As has been ex-
15There are potentially two diﬀerent ways to calculate this dummy and also some others to follow: the
decentile may be calculated with respect to the full data set, or for every year individually. In the results
displayed in the paper, we chose the latter method. The former, however, does not change our results.
Results are available upon request.
11plained in section 2, the incentive to engage in securitization should be higher for banks
with a shortfall in liquidity. We therefore expect a negative sign for the overall liquidity
coeﬃcient and a positive sign for the decile of banks with lowest liquidity (regressor low
liquidity for the dummy variable and low liquidity * liquidity for the interaction term).
In line with earlier work on the wealth eﬀects of securitization transactions, we take
into account a diﬀerential impact of weak versus strong banks. In this respect, we use
two variables as proxies for the performance of a bank: return on equity (RoE) and cost-
income ratio (CIR).16 In the overall sample, both a positive or a negative coeﬃcient may
be conceivable due to earlier research results, while a positive sign seems reasonable for
the banks with the lowest performance, measured by the decile with the highest value of
the CIR variable (regressors low performance for the dummy variable and low performance
* CIR for the eﬀect of performance on the subgroup).17 In order to give more insight on
the “appetite-for-risk” hypothesis, we also include a dummy for the decentile of ﬁrms with
highest performance. According to the risk-appetite argument, particularly banks with
high performance should be active in loan securitization.
Finally, we include some general characteristics of the originating ﬁrm as additional
regressors. First, we analyze the impact of ﬁrm size by taking account of total assets.F o r
this variable, a positive sign is expected due to economies of scale following from the ﬁxed
costs of setting up a CLO structure. The tax variable captures a combination of size and
ﬁrm quality and therefore should be assigned a positive coeﬃcient. In essence, it comprises
the taxes paid relative to earnings before taxes. However, also a negative eﬀect may be
conceivable since securitization leads to a potential reduction in tax beneﬁts from keeping
the assets on balance sheet. Therefore, institutions with high eﬀective debt burden may
securitize less (Minton et al., 2004). A high value of the business variable indicates that
the bank generates high proﬁts from investment banking or related activities. We expect
a positive sign for this regressor. Still, the results with respect to this ﬁnal variable may
be strongly dependent on regulatory mechanisms and may therefore be relatively weak for
European data.
Note that the multitude of variables and their various eﬀects may be summed up in three
hypotheses. The test of an impact of regulatory capital coincides with testing the regulatory
capital arbitrage hypothesis. All variables that may aﬀect a bank’s ﬁnancial distress costs
allow for a test of the eﬃcient contracting hypothesis. While the risk, respectively quality,
variable certainly belongs to this group of factors, it also contributes to testing the appetite-
for-risk hypothesis.
Table 10 in the appendix ﬁnally reports the diﬀerent macroeconomic variables that are
used as regressors. We employ the following country-speciﬁc variables for the total sample:
credit default probability, ratio of rating downgrades to upgrades, GDP-growth rate, short-
and long-term interest rates and yield on a well-diversiﬁed stock index (e.g., CDAX for
Germany, Euronext CAC for France, FTSE 350 for UK). Among the dummy variables,
we consider year-dummies, country-dummies and industry-dummies for the banks. In the
sample restricted on stock-listed banks, we additionally take into account the volatility of
stock returns, the market-to-book ratio (MBR) and the ﬁrm’s beta. Again, these variables
16We also tested for an inﬂuence of return on assets (RoA). The results are essentially the same as for
RoE.
17For stock-listed banks we also include a test for the best-performing banks measured as those in the
decile with lowest CIR values with regressors high performance and high performance * CIR.
12Table 4: Deﬁnition of ﬁrm characteristics
Deﬁnition of ﬁrm characteristics to be included as regressors in the logit regressions on the
probability to securitize assets. Dummy variables are calculated for each year individually.
Variable generation is based on Bankscope and Datastream database.
Regressor Deﬁnition Expected sign
Asset characteristics:
Risk credit risk provision / (+)
net interest income
High risk (dummy) decentile of banks with highest risk (+)
High risk * risk high risk (dummy) multiplied (-)
by risk variable
High risk * low tier 1 high risk (dummy) multiplied (-)
(dummy, stock-listed ﬁrms only) by low tier 1 (dummy)
Quality gross interest income / (+/-)
gross outstanding accounts
Equity characteristics:
Tier 1 tier 1 capital / (-)
risk weighted assets
Low tier 1 (dummy) decentile of banks with (+)
lowest tier 1 capital
Low tier 1 * tier 1 low tier 1 (dummy) multiplied (-)
by tier 1 variable
Equity share equity / total assets (-)
Performance characteristics:
RoE return on average equity (+/-)
CIR cost-income ratio (+/-)
Low performance (dummy) decentile of banks with highest CIR (+)
Low performance * CIR low performance (dummy) multiplied (-)
by CIR variable
Liquidity characteristics:
Liquidity money lent to other banks / (-)
money borrowed from other banks
Low liquidity (dummy) decentile of banks with lowest liquidity (+)
Low liquidity * liquidity low liquidity (dummy) (-)
multiplied by liquidity variable
General characteristics:
Total assets total assets (+)
Tax taxes / earnings before taxes (+)
Business net fees & commissions / (+/-)
net interest revenue
13may give a hint at ﬁrms’ risk-appetite, implying that ﬁrms securitizing loans in order to
increase their performance hope to be awarded by the market for this via a higher market-
to-book ratio and increase their beta.
4.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 11 in the appendix presents the general statistics with regard to the diﬀerent ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and macroeconomic explanatory variables. From the data, it can be seen that
banks in our sample are very heterogeneous, in particular with respect to their risk charac-
teristics, but also regarding their performance and equity capital holdings.18 In particular
the large range of tier 1 capital that banks hold is indicative of vastly diﬀerent business
strategies, also stemming - of course - from the diﬀerent types of banks we are considering.
Additionally, the switch from holding capital appropriate for Basel I to the new regula-
tory requests in Basel II, that should coincide with our sample period, may have led to
relatively heterogeneous observations with regard to tier 1 capital. As we cannot infer the
exact switching time from our data, we may only hypothesize that large banks tended to
change their regulatory capital holdings relatively early compared to smaller banks. Data
with respect to the size of total assets also mirror the large disparity of the total sample.
The same is true for the additional data on stock-listed banks as can be seen from the
large ranges of volatility, market-to-book ratio and beta values.
The statistics of macroeconomic regressors parallel the movement through the economic
cycle. This is particularly obvious from the large range of values for GDP-growth rates,
interest rates and country-speciﬁc stock market indeces. A breakdown of the index’ and
interest rate’s development in diﬀerent countries can be found in table 13 in the appendix.
Our sample hence contains heterogeneous ﬁnancial institutions that focus on diﬀerent




As a ﬁrst step in our analysis, we divide the total sample into the group of banks that
did not securitize loans and the group that did issue CLOs and examine the diﬀerences-
in-means in characteristics between the two. Results concerning these univariate tests are
given in table 5. It displays the number of observations in each group, the mean and
standard deviation of the coeﬃcient. As can already be seen, the smallest number of
observations is obtained with regard to the test of tier 1 capital. The last column in table
5 provides the p-values of a test on the equality of the two subsamples’ means.
Signiﬁcant results are derived both with regard to ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic
variables. Among the ﬁrm-speciﬁc regressors it is only the equity share and the return on
equity that do not lead to signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the two subsamples. Among the
18Further information can be obtained from table 12 in the appendix where descriptive statistics are
given for three subgroups of banks: those with highest risk, with highest performance and lowest equity.
14macroeconomic variables we observe that only the country speciﬁc index yield does not
play a signiﬁcant role. Summarizing the univariate results we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial institu-
tions securitizing loans seem to be lowly-performing, large ﬁrms with low capital ratios,
high risk of lower quality and low liquidity. Additionally, they seem to be engaged more
strongly in investment-banking activities that generate fee income. With regard to macroe-
conomic variables, we observe that a higher probability of credit default and credit rating
downgrades (with low yields on credit risk and a high spread), low GDP growth rates and
interest rates seem to be conducive to securitization.
Table 5: Univariate tests of diﬀerences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic characteristics
- all banks
N denotes the number of entries in the respective category. Mean refers to the mean value
of the respective variable in the two sub-groups. p-values of the tests on equality of means
are reported in the last column. *, **, ***: signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
securitization no securitization
Regressor Nsec mean std. dev. Nnosec mean std. dev. p-value
Risk (in %) 278 21.37 25.75 1362 17.55 34.80 0.083*
Quality (in %) 290 9.86 6.03 1395 11.11 8.24 0.015**
Tier 1 (in %) 220 7.80 2.24 825 9.51 8.33 0.003***
Equity share (in %) 296 4.62 2.20 1426 5.16 7.11 0.196
RoE (in %) 296 9.94 11.40 1420 10.62 10.92 0.334
CIR (in %) 290 63.98 15.86 1408 58.99 22.35 0.000***
Liquidity (in %) 278 86.06 92.47 1343 115.85 124.29 0.000***
Total assets (in bn EUR) 296 198.077 208.904 1,426 95.906 125.239 0.000***
Loans (in bn EUR) 296 91.554 91.422 1,424 46.194 56.041 0.000***
Tax (in %) 288 26.82 16.41 1364 30.23 16.34 0.001***
Business (in %) 286 49.99 85.66 1400 36.83 49.79 0.000***
CDP (in %) 296 2.51 0.87 1426 2.06 1.00 0.000***
DUR 296 2.40 0.99 1426 2.06 1.00 0.000***
GDP Rate (in %) 296 2.26 1.65 1426 2.50 1.68 0.028**
Index (Basis 1995) 294 220.40 60.15 1327 219.30 71.88 0.807
Short interest (in %) 296 3.71 1.18 1426 4.01 1.47 0.001***
Long interest (in %) 294 4.78 0.60 1381 5.05 0.78 0.000***
Credit risk spread (in %) 296 1.60 0.41 1426 1.31 0.58 0.000***
As table 14 (in the appendix) shows, the ratio of ﬁrms using securitization versus
those that did not is increasing over the years. Various dummy variables also account for
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between securitizing and non-securitizing ﬁnancial institutions. Par-
ticularly in France, UK and Spain there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the sub-groups.
Also, we ﬁnd that commercial banks are much more likely to choose securitization while
real estate banks are less likely to do so. Combined with the fact that securitizing banks
derive signiﬁcantly higher fee income, this points to an interesting ﬁrst conclusion: by issu-
ing CLOs, commercial banks possibly try to (indirectly) increase their stake in investment
banking by using new instruments (of securitization) in their traditional business ﬁeld of
bank lending.
Tables 6 and 15 (in the appendix) deliver the results of the same univariate analy-
sis on the sub-sample of stock-listed banks. While the results are similar with regard
15to macroeconomic variables, ﬁrm-speciﬁc regressors lead to slightly diﬀerent conclusions.
Stock-listed ﬁnancial institutions using securitization have a higher market-to-book ratio
and beta than non-issuing ﬁrms, a lower capital ratio, a higher cost-income-ratio, much
lower liquidity and only slightly higher total assets than ﬁrms that are not using CLOs.
Overall, among stock-listed ﬁrms, the diﬀerences between securitizing and non-securitizing
ﬁnancial institutions are much smaller than in the total sample. In particular, risk charac-
teristics do not seem to drive the diﬀerence between the two groups of banks. Interestingly,
the stock-return volatility does not account for a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. In this respect, our
results diﬀer from Minton et al. (2004), who ﬁnd that issuing ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly
lower stock return volatility.
Table 6: Univariate tests of diﬀerences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic characteristics
- stock-listed banks only
N denotes the number of entries in the respective category. Mean refers to the mean value
of the respective variable in the two sub-groups. p-values of the tests on equality of means
are reported in the last column. *, **, ***: signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
securitization no securitization
Regressor N mean std. dev. N mean std. dev. p-value
Risk (in %) 138 22.02 14.00 402 21.23 33.95 0.791
Quality (in %) 138 9.72 3.03 404 9.40 5.41 0.499
Tier 1 (in %) 117 7.32 1.59 281 7.95 2.42 0.010***
Equity share (in %) 138 4.66 1.69 404 5.16 2.50 0.030**
RoE (in %) 138 11.14 8.52 404 11.18 12.43 0.970
CIR (in %) 138 64.37 16.12 401 60.95 14.37 0.020**
Liquidity (in %) 138 76.23 54.63 399 110.89 107.4 0.000***
Total assets (in bn EUR) 138 11.81 1.25 404 11.26 1.14 0.000***
Loans (in bn EUR) 138 11.17 1.10 404 10.64 1.08 0.000***
Tax (in %) 138 26.73 16.41 401 29.48 14.41 0.062*
Business (in %) 138 56.98 41.96 401 45.21 29.36 0.000***
CDP (in %) 138 2.44 0.88 404 2.13 1.01 0.001***
DUR 138 2.30 0.99 404 2.13 1.02 0.078*
GDP Rate (in %) 138 2.48 1.87 404 2.67 1.99 0.319
Index (Basis 1995) 138 231.24 56.88 366 215.40 73.74 0.023**
Short interest (in %) 138 3.71 1.15 404 4.22 1.84 0.003***
Long interest (in %) 138 4.83 0.61 392 5.13 0.90 0.000***
Credit risk spread (in %) 138 1.54 0.43 404 1.36 0.58 0.001***
Volatility 138 12.41 7.59 404 12.50 9.39 0.914
MBR 135 2.57 1.58 386 2.27 1.72 0.070*
Beta 133 0.67 0.21 392 0.57 0.28 0.000***
5.2 Multivariate Results
Table 7 presents the results of a multivariate logit regression on the likelihood of issuing
securitized assets via a CLO by all sample banks as delineated in section 3.3. Three diﬀerent
model types are tested. Models I und II include ﬁrm-speciﬁc regressors, year-, country-
and business-dummy variables. As information about tier 1 capital is only obtainable
for a subgroup of ﬁrms in our sample, it is included only in model I, so that model II -
16otherwise identical to I - allows for a larger sample size. Models Ia and IIa include the
above-mentioned additional ﬁrm-speciﬁc dummy variables and interaction terms, whereas
models Ib and IIb contain only the interaction terms, but not the dummies. Model III
allows for macroeconomic variables as additional explanatory variables.
Among the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, the magnitude of total assets has a signiﬁcantly posi-
tive inﬂuence on the likelihood of securitization. In all models, a larger bank is hence more
likely to engage in securitization. Also the riskiness of loans increases the likelihood of
securitization (in all but model III). A bank’s liquidity, in contrast, reduces the probability
of issuing a CLO. An increasing eﬀect is ﬁnally also found for the cost-income ratio. In-
terestingly, tier 1 capital does not have a generally signiﬁcant impact on a bank’s decision
to issue CLOs.
From models Ia,b and IIa,b we can additionally infer that banks in the decile of highest
risk have a signiﬁcantly positive propensity to engage in loan securitization. Still, for those
banks the probability of issuing CLOs decreases along with more credit risk as can be seen
from the signiﬁcantly negative sign of the interaction term high risk * risk. Interestingly,
paralleling the behavior of the risk variable, we also observe that the liquidity regressor
reverses its sign in the extreme decile. The dummy for banks with lowest liquidity moreover
does not turn out to be signiﬁcant any more. As such, we may conclude that particularly
large banks seem to use loan securitization to transfer risk and increase liquidity but that
both functions appear to be limited in the extremes. For banks with lowest tier 1 capital,
we ﬁnd a negative, but not signiﬁcant eﬀect, while the interaction term turns out to be
signiﬁcantly positive. Regulatory capital hence does not play the expected role.
With regard to the further dummy variables, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects for
all year dummies because of the increase in overall securitization activity. The country
dummies for Germany, Italy and the UK are mainly signiﬁcantly positive, for France the
dummy is always negative. With respect to the bank type dummies we obtain highly
signiﬁcant and positive eﬀects for almost all business types except for investment banks.
Banks’ securitization decisions moreover seem to be positively inﬂuenced by the yield
spread between high-quality and low-quality corporate bonds, but are negatively aﬀected
by long-term interest rates. Inclusion of macroeconomic variables does not, however, seem
to increase the explanatory power of the regression over the basic model I.
Results from the regressions on stock-listed ﬁnancial institutions are given in table
8. They are fairly similar to the total sample and even more pronounced in absolute
magnitude. Again, bank size, credit risk and liquidity seem to be main drivers of the
securitization decision. The surrounding macroeconomy and stock-market dependency
appear to play a lesser role, though. As before, we ﬁnd that regulatory concerns hold only
within the group of banks with lowest tier 1 capital. It is very obvious here, that the ten
percent of banks with lowest tier 1 capital display a generally low likelihood of securitizing
their loans. This contrasts with the usual intuition of securitization transactions being
used in order to save on regulatory capital. Similarly to the total sample, we ﬁnd that
the probability of issuing CLOs in this subgroup increases along with tier 1 capital. This
may imply that loan securitization can help banks to fulﬁll their regulatory requirements;
however, this function is limited such that it may not be used as a last resort. Yet,
results with regard to the tier 1 variable are not very straightforward to interpret, because
securitization activity in our sample increased over the years, while tier 1 capital gradually
17Table 7: Logit analysis - all banks
Logit regression estimates of the likelihood of issuing assets via a CLO-transaction. The
dependent variable equals one if a bank accomplishes an CLO-transaction and zero otherwise.
Coef. is the coeﬃcient estimate. Standard errors are clustered by banks. Log likelihood is
the maximized value of the log likelihood function l(ˆ β). Pseudo R
2 is an analog to the R
2
reported in linear regression models. *, **, ***: signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level,
respectively.
Model Model Model Model Model Model Model
II a I b I I I I a I I b I I I
Regressor Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef Coef. Coef. Coef.
Constant -13.862*** -15.224*** -14.481*** -13.460*** -13.804*** -13.807*** -10.756***
Risk 0.012* 0.059*** 0.042*** 0.007* 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.005
Quality 0.033* 0.035 0.033 -0.002 0.002 0.003 -0.003
Tier 1 -0.035 0.046 0.032
Equity Share 0.123 0.066 0.077 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.001
RoE 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.008
CIR 0.013 0.024* 0.020 0.015* 0.024* 0.022* 0.012
Liquidity -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004** -0.004* -0.004* -0.004**
LN (Total Assets) 0.554*** 0.515*** 0.521*** 0.597*** 0.543*** 0.568*** 0.581***
TAX -0.006 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002
Business -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes no
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes




Credit risk spread 0.927***
Low tier 1 -0.469
Low tier 1*tier 1 0.249 0.162**
High risk 2.099*** 0.890**
High risk*risk -0.063*** -0.031*** -0.038*** -0.026***
Low performance -0.357 2.801*
Low performance*cir -0.002 -0.006 -0.037* -0.006
Low liquidity 0.644 -0.396
Low liquidity*liquidity 0.002 0.039 0.055* 0.035
N 952 952 952 1509 1509 1509 1410
Log pseudo-likelihood -378.47 -363.34 -369.22 -529.22 -517.83 -520.83 -518.62
Wald statistic 184.84 189.44 183.24 204.96 223.75 210.61 177.76
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.24
18decreased.
Similarly to the results on the total bank sample, we ﬁnd that banks in the highest-risk
decile have a high propensity to engage in loan securitization but that the probability of
issuing CLOs in this subgroup decreases along with credit risk. Again, this may point to a
certain limit to use this instrument as a risk-transfer tool. Models IVc,d ﬁnally show that
banks with high risk and low equity have a high propensity to issue CLOs as given by the
positive coeﬃcient of the high risk * low tier 1 regressor.
Note that table 8 includes the dummy high performance (and the respective interaction
term) instead of the dummy on the 10% of banks with lowest performance as in the test on
the total sample.19 It is interesting to note that performance plays a much stronger role
for a stock-listed bank than for an average bank. In contrast to risk and liquidity variables,
the performance variable keeps its negative impact on CLO issuance also in the extremes.
At the same time, both extremely well-performing and extremely poorly-performing banks
are unlikely to securitize their loans. Combined with the univariate result that stock-
listed banks issuing CLOs display a slightly lower performance than non-issuing banks,
loan securitization may hence be conjectured to be a weak instrument to ﬁne-tune banks’
performance rather than a consequence of “risk-appetite”.
With regard to dummy variables, we ﬁnd slightly less signiﬁcant and also more ambigu-
ous eﬀects as compared to the total sample. In particular, the country dummies display less
constant impacts: only for UK and Spain we do obtain signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients.
While we also observe positive (and mostly signiﬁcant) eﬀects for commercial, cooperative
and real estate banks, the dummy for other banks - including investment banks - now
displays a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient.
19The dummy low performance and the corresponding interaction term turned out be insigniﬁcant. Re-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Several auxiliary analyses have been conducted in order to improve the robustness of our
results. With regard to regressors we tested diﬀerent variables, in line with our informal
arguments of section 4, for inclusion into the model. In order to capture an institution’s
credit risk, for instance, we also used the ratio of credit risk provision over gross outstand-
ing accounts, or the ratio of nonperforming loans over assigned loans. Both did not deliver
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent results in the multivariate analysis. However, since data on nonper-
forming loans were not available for German banks, this measure decreased our sample
size considerably. With respect to other ﬁrm characteristics, we also used the number of
assigned loans to approximate bank size, return on assets as a proxy for performance and
various diﬀerent measures for liquidity. Inclusion of these variables did not change the
results displayed in tables 7 and 8. We also tested the inﬂuence of additional decentile-
dummies based on the various ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables values, e.g. a dummy for the 10% of
banks with lowest risk.20
To mitigate the problem of multi-collinearity, we excluded highly-correlated regressors.
Correlation coeﬃcients for each possible combination of two regressors are given in tables
16 and 17 in the appendix. Overall, ﬁve combinations of highly correlated coeﬃcients
were observed and led to the exclusion of variables loans, short interest, credit risk spread,
performance AAA and performance BBB in the multivariate analyses.
Furthermore, we considered diﬀerent model speciﬁcations in order to take account of
the data reduction following from individual variable arrangements. This is particularly
obvious for models accounting for equity characteristics that were not available for all
banks. We therefore constructed one individual model (model I for the full sample, model
IV for the sample on stock-listed banks) that entails variable tier 1 capital, which reduced
the number of observations to 952 in the full sample and to 365 in the test on stock-listed
banks. In models II, III, V and VI we disregarded this variable in order to increase the
number of eligible observations.
Finally, we also accounted for the fact that large banks typically enter the group of
“securitizers” much more frequently than small banks. This may have an eﬀect on our
results as the characteristics of these banks are then observed more often than those of
smaller banks that chose to issue CLOs less often, if at all. We take account of this
eﬀect in a panel analysis where we control for ﬁxed eﬀects. The results are given in table
9. Models VIIa,b and VIII are run on the total sample, models IXa-c and X on the sub-
sample of stock-listed banks only. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that bank size hardly inﬂuences the
securitization decision any more. Obviously, also smaller institutions are able to surmount
the ﬁxed costs associated with setting up a loan securitization program. Risk and liquidity
concerns also do not seem to be as important any more, while the equity share gains
in importance. Its positive inﬂuence runs slightly counter, however, to the signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect of tier 1 capital.
For stock-listed banks, we also ﬁnd that the market-to-book ratio inﬂuences the securi-
tization decision signiﬁcantly positive. This may, at least, be a hint a banks’ risk-appetite
leading them to increase their market exposure via loan securitization. Interestingly, also
the tax and the business variable have a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the panel study. As both are
20Results are available upon request.
21negative, we may conclude that banks with higher tax payments are more reluctant to
engage in loan securitization, which will reduce the beneﬁts of “on balance-sheet” debt.
In contrast, the negative coeﬃcient of the business variable is not very straightforward to
interpret. It may be a sign that banks with high income from credit lending and relatively































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































236 Discussion of results
Our results point to a reﬁnement of the eﬃcient contracting hypothesis regarding the use
of loan securitization. Generally, we ﬁnd that a bank is more likely to issue CLOs the
larger the bank (more assets), the higher the bank’s credit risk exposure, the lower its liq-
uidity and the lower its performance (measured by cost-income ratio). Interestingly, equity
capital - or, more precisely, tier 1 capital - does not seem to inﬂuence banks’ securitization
decisions very strongly. We also observe that banks in diﬀerent countries display diﬀer-
ent propensities to engage in securitization activities, while we can hardly discriminate
between banks’ business types. With regard to macroeconomic factors, particularly yields
on long-term government bonds seem to aﬀect a bank’s securitization decision.
In order to diﬀerentiate between securitization being used as an instrument of reducing
ﬁnancial distress costs or in order to feed banks’ risk-appetite, we looked particularly at
the risk eﬀects in more detail. We ﬁnd that the generally positive risk impact also holds
for the 10% of banks with highest risk. Yet, among these, the inﬂuence of the risk variable
is reversed. The propensity to transfer risk thus seems to be limited in the extreme. A
similar (but less signiﬁcant) reversal eﬀect is observed with respect to liquidity, but not with
regard to performance. Particularly for stock-listed banks, a persistently negative inﬂuence
of performance on securitization decisions is observed. Given that according to the risk-
appetite hypothesis, banks should try to securitize in order to increase their performance,
we may conjecture that securitization seems to be used only as a weak instrument to
ﬁne-tune performance rather than a mechanism to feed banks’ risk-appetite.
Correcting for potential ﬁxed eﬀects in our sample, we ﬁnd that bank size is not nec-
essarily a decisive factor for securitizing loans. In other words, the ﬁxed costs associated
with setting up a securitization program seem to be surmountable also for smaller bank-
ing institutions. The panel analysis also shows that the origin of revenue generation (the
business variable) is no longer negligible. Combined with the fact that particularly com-
mercial banks seem to be active in the CLO market, we may therefore conclude that loan
securitization appears to oﬀer an attractive way to indirectly tap the market for invest-
ment banking activities (and the associated gains) without directly crossing the traditional
border to investment bank businesses.
While our general results are not in favor of the regulatory capital arbitrage hypothesis,
we cannot reject an inﬂuence for stock-listed banks. Particularly in combination with high
credit risk, a shortage in equity capital has a strongly positive impact on loan securitization.
Hence, we cannot totally decline regulatory capital arbitrage, but it does not seem to
hamper the growth in credit risk transfer in the years to come.
Taken together, our ﬁndings are indicative of securitization transactions mainly be-
ing used as a risk-transfer and funding tool that allows a more eﬃcient risk-sharing and
liquidity transformation. Still, as the reversal of the regressors’ eﬀects in the extreme
deciles shows, both functions seem to be limited. This result coincides with observations
from CRT markets that banks tend to retain the highest-risk CLO tranches and therefore
risk-transfer is (still) small relative to notional size.
247 Conclusion
Based on recent research on the markets for credit risk transfer, this study examined ﬁrm-
speciﬁc and macroeconomic factors that drive ﬁnancial institutions’ decisions to engage in
loan securitization transactions. While we cannot reject the hypothesis that banks use loan
securitization to save on regulatory capital, we ﬁnd that the main factors driving banks’
securitization decisions are bank size, credit risk, liquidity and performance. Particularly
large banks seem to use securitization transactions to reduce exposure to default risk and
increase liquidity. Still, risk-transfer and funding capacity seem to be limited: ﬁrms in the
lowest decile of liquidity do not show a signiﬁcant inclination towards loan securitization;
for ﬁrms in the highest credit risk decile, the variable’s eﬀect even gets reversed.
As a conclusion we may state that the market for credit risk transfer does not seem
to be hampered by the new Basel II framework that will no longer allow for regulatory
capital arbitrage. Rather, it seems that loan securitization is mainly used as a ﬁnancial
engineering instrument, reducing ﬁnancial distress costs related to bank lending. In this
respect, credit risk transfer appears to be conducive to the ongoing disintermediation pro-
cess in the traditionally bank-based European ﬁnancial system. Particularly commercial
banks are given - and seize - the opportunity to access market-based banking activities
and possibly also try to feed their risk-appetite in order to increase expected returns via
CLO transactions.
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28Appendix
Table 10: Deﬁnition of macroeconomic and dummy variables
Regressor Deﬁnition
Macroeconomic variables:
CDP credit default probability
DUR rating downgrade-upgrade-ratio
GDP Rate GDP-growth rate
Index country speciﬁc yield of a well diversiﬁed stock index
(Germany = CDAX, France = CAC40, UK = FTSE 350)
Short interest Libor 3 month
Long interest long-term interest rate of country speciﬁc government bonds
Credit risk spread diﬀerence between yield of AAA- and BBB-rated risk indices
Performance AAA yield of AAA-rated credit risk index (MSCI Overall)
Performance BBB yield of BBB-rated credit risk index (MSCI Overall)
Dummy variables:
LIST 1 if bank is listed, 0 otherwise
Year 1997 1 in 1997, 0 otherwise
Year 1998 1 in 1998, 0 otherwise
Year 1999 1 in 1999, 0 otherwise
Year 2000 1 in 2000, 0 otherwise
Year 2001 1 in 2001, 0 otherwise
Year 2002 1 in 2002, 0 otherwise
Year 2003 1 in 2003, 0 otherwise
Germany 1 if bank registered in Germany, 0 otherwise
France 1 if bank registered in France, 0 otherwise
UK 1 if bank registered in UK, 0 otherwise
Spain 1 if bank registered in Spain, 0 otherwise
Italy 1 if bank registered in Italy, 0 otherwise
Other country 1 if bank not registered in countries above, 0 otherwise
Commercial 1 if commercial bank, 0 otherwise
Cooperative 1 if cooperative bank, 0 otherwise
Real 1 if real estate bank, 0 otherwise
Investment 1 if investment bank, 0 otherwise
Savings 1 if savings bank, 0 otherwise
Other type 1 if bank not registered in classiﬁcation above, 0 otherwise
For stock-listed banks only:
Volatility stock return volatility
MBR market-to-book ratio
Beta beta coeﬃcient calculated via market model
29Table 11: Descriptive statistics - ﬁrm-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables
Descriptive statistics for banks in our sample in the time period 1997 to 2004. Calculations
are based on the full sample of 1948 banks.
Regressor N mean std. dev. median range
Firm speciﬁc:
Risk (in %) 1640 18.19 334.66 130.40 [-238.76; 724.94]
Quality (in %) 1685 10.89 79.19 91.17 [0.00; 97.08]
Tier 1 (in %) 1045 9.15 7.50 7.80 [1.80; 87.00]
Equity share (in %) 1722 5.07 6.54 4.35 [0.27; 86.59]
RoE (in %) 1716 10.50 11.00 10.44 [-110.04; 115.51]
CIR (in %) 1698 59.84 21.46 61.84 [0.71; 441.33]
Liquidity (in %) 1621 110.74 119.94 77.56 [0.00; 995.80]
Total assets (in billion) 1722 113.47 148.17 50.74 [0.17; 994.97]
Loans (in billion) 1720 53.99 65.78 26.86 [0.00; 419.41]
Tax (in %) 1652 29.64 16.40 29.28 [0.00; 99.84]
Business (in %) 1686 39.06 57.66 31.19 [0.00; 868.86]
Macroeconomic:
CDP (in %) 1722 2.14 1.00 2.16 [0.66; 3.82]
DUR 1722 2.12 1.00 2.06 [0.85; 4.16]
GDP Rate (in %) 1722 2.46 1.68 2.00 [-1.10; 11.70]
Index (Basis 1995) 1621 219.50 69.88 206.50 [114.10; 778.70]
Short interest (in %) 1722 3.96 1.43 3.56 [0.33; 13.97]
Long interest (in %) 1675 5.00 0.76 4.91 [2.63; 9.92]
Credit risk spread (in bp) 1722 136 57 150 [27;226]
Performance AAA (in bp) 1722 8 12 10 [-15;22]
Performance BBB (in bp) 1722 9 12 16 [-7;20]
For quoted banks only:
Volatility 542 0.12 0.09 0.11 [0.01; 1.25]
MBR 521 2.35 1.69 2.13 [-14.48; 9.99]
Beta 564 0.59 0.46 0.53 [-1.26;3.64]
30Table 12: Descriptive statistics - sub-groups
General and descriptive statistics with regard to ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables for three subgroups
of banks: banks in the decile of highest credit risk (highest risk)of lowest cost-income ratio
(highest performance) and of lowest equity (lowest tier 1 capital).
Banks with highest risk
General statistics: Number of securitizations = 46
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N1 4 2 2 1 6 2 6 1 9 3 7 3 1
Country Germany France UK Spain Italy Other country
N 89 30 3 26 3 14
Bank Commercial Cooperative Real Investment Savings Other type
N6 8 1 6 1 7 4 2 5 8
Firm speciﬁc regressors:
Mean Std. dev. Median Range
Risk 74.46 78.65 51.41 [37.20;724.94]
Quality 11.98 8.83 10.3 [0.00;83.42]
Tier 1 7.81 4.95 6.4 [4.30;44.92]
Equity Share 4.25 6.84 0.46 [0.46;86.59]
RoE 1.41 16.95 5.54 [-110.04;32.63]
CIR 57.78 24.3 60.95 [14.59;172.42]
Liquidity 85.36 94.43 65.67 0.40;692.47]
Total assets 120,364 124,619 69,970 [12,452;526,452]
Tax 20.43 18.87 18.54 [0.00;70.20]
Business 51.49 101.01 23.85 [0.00;868.86]
Banks with best performance
General statistics: Number of securitizations = 9
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N3 1 2 8 2 1 2 6 2 1 1 9 1 9
Country Germany France UK Spain Italy Other country
N 69 14 4 17 6 55
Bank Commercial Cooperative Real Investment Savings Other type
N5 0 6 9 0 1 0 4 5
Firm speciﬁc regressors:
Mean Std. dev. Median Range
Risk 24.32 35.12 17.67 [-41.36;239.53]
Quality 10.53 7.43 8.18 [0;46.49]
Tier 1 18.56 19.03 11.10 [5.10;84.30]
Equity Share 5.11 11.10 2.99 [0.46;86.59]
RoE 9.90 11.41 10.24 [-110.04;33.25]
CIR 21.80 8.37 24.21 [0.71;32.48]
Liquidity 159.01 200.05 79.97 [0.00;973.66]
Total assets 52,730 52,641 35,858 [593.7;301,777]
Tax 30.30 16.40 31.71 [0.00;70.81]
Business 5.14 10.48 0.36 [0.00; 56.58]
Banks with low equity
General statistics: Number of securitizations = 25
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N2 4 2 1 1 5 1 7 1 2 9 6
Country Germany France UK Spain Italy Other country
N5 3 1 5 0 2 8 2 6
Bank Commercial Cooperative Real Investment Savings Other type
N 49 8 12 3 1 31
Firm speciﬁc regressors:
Mean Std. dev. Median Range
Risk 39.72 80.46 25.02 [-12.36;724.94]
Quality 10.50 3.83 9.87 [0.46;21.69]
Tier 1 5.02 0.67 5.15 [1.80;5.70]
Equity Share 3.52 1.95 2.98 [0.30;9.15]
RoE 7.24 17.34 7.54 [-71.24;115.51]
CIR 63.98 14.92 66.28 [22.45;109.95]
Liquidity 89.00 74.02 73.82 [12.52;595.61]
Total assets 117,610 125,281 76,944 [10,325;695,344]
Tax 33.92 18.50 38.69 [0.00;75.25]
Business 40.71 45.81 32.42 [0.00;282.40]
31Table 13: Country-speciﬁc separation of macroeconomic variables index and long interest
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Index
Germany 173.8 234.7 249.8 332.9 262.5 195.5 149.4
France 147.3 197.6 242.9 334.8 268 202.6 166.5
UK 139.9 168.1 187.5 190.1 165.9 137.3 120.8
Italy 139.6 219.7 241.4 316.4 249.5 190.8 170.6
Spain 194 284.2 309.8 336.5 271 217.8 206.5
Long Interest
Germany 5.64 4.57 4.49 5.26 4.8 4.78 4.07
France 5.58 4.64 4.61 5.39 4.94 4.86 4.13
UK 7.13 5.6 5.01 5.33 5.01 4.91 4.58
Italy 6.86 4.88 4.73 5.58 5.19 5.03 4.25
Spain 6.4 4.83 4.73 5.53 5.12 4.96 4.12
Table 14: Univariate tests of diﬀerences in dummy variables - all banks
Overall, 1722 observations are included, with 296 securitizations and 1426 no-securitizations.
N denotes the number of entries in the respective category, e.g. 257 bank entries in year 1997
of which 7 belonged to banks securitizing loans (Nsec) and 250 to banks not issuing CLOs,
Nnosec. p-values refer to the respective χ
2-Test. *, **, ***: signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%- and
1%-level, respectively.
overall securitization no securitization χ
2-Test
Regressor N Nsec (in %) Nnosec (in %) Pearson p-value
χ
2
Year 1997 257 7 0.02 250 0.18 44.41 0.000***
Year 1998 247 22 0.07 225 0.16 13.90 0.000***
Year 1999 250 43 0.15 207 0.15 0.00 0.996
Year 2000 250 45 0.15 205 0.14 0.14 0.713
Year 2001 244 59 0.2 185 0.13 9.76 0.002***
Year 2002 241 59 0.2 182 0.13 10.47 0.001***
Year 2003 233 61 0.21 172 0.12 15.30 0.000***
Germany 406 68 0.23 338 0.24 0.07 0.788
France 239 29 0.1 210 0.15 4.98 0.026**
UK 243 57 0.19 186 0.13 7.81 0.005***
Spain 106 43 0.15 63 0.04 43.36 0.000***
Italy 187 29 0.1 158 0.11 0.42 0.519
Other country 541 70 0.24 471 0.33 10.01 0.002***
Commercial 750 193 0.65 557 0.39 68.14 0.000***
Cooperative 212 33 0.11 179 0.13 0.45 0.504
Real 155 14 0.05 141 0.1 7.96 0.005***
Investment 106 20 0.07 86 0.06 0.22 0.636
Savings 65 16 0.05 49 0.03 2.62 0.106
Other type 434 20 0.07 414 0.29 64.52 0.000***
32Table 15: Univariate tests of diﬀerences in dummy variables - stock-listed banks only
Overall, 542 observations are included, with 138 securitizations and 404 no-securitizations. N
denotes the number of entries in the respective category, e.g. 67 bank entries in year 1997
of which 5 belonged to banks securitizing loans (Nsec) and 62 to banks not issuing CLOs,
Nnosec. p-values refer to the respective χ
2-Test. *, **, ***: signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%- and
1%-level, respectively.
overall securitization no securitization χ
2-Test
Regressor N Nsec (in %) Nnosec (in %) Pearson p-value
χ
2
LIST 542 138 0.47 404 0.28 38.02 0.000***
Year 1997 67 5 0.04 62 0.15 13.05 0.000***
Year 1998 71 13 0.09 58 0.14 2.20 0.138
Year 1999 74 22 0.16 52 0.13 0.82 0.364
Year 2000 81 25 0.18 56 0.14 1.46 0.226
Year 2001 82 25 0.18 57 0.14 1.29 0.257
Year 2002 83 24 0.17 59 0.15 0.62 0.432
Year 2003 84 24 0.17 60 0.15 0.51 0.477
Germany 98 35 0.25 63 0.16 6.63 0.010***
France 46 14 0.1 32 0.08 0.66 0.418
UK 77 17 0.12 60 0.15 0.54 0.462
Spain 93 21 0.15 72 0.18 0.49 0.484
Italy 38 23 0.17 15 0.04 26.48 0.000***
Other country 190 28 0.2 162 0.4 17.73 0.000***
Commercial 295 114 0.83 181 0.45 59.28 0.000***
Cooperative 43 12 0.09 31 0.08 0.15 0.701
Real 40 6 0.04 34 0.08 2.49 0.115
Investment 7 2 0.01 5 0.01 no test possible
Savings 13 0 0 13 0.03 no test possible
Other type 144 4 0.03 140 0.35 53.17 0.000***
Table 16: Correlation matrix of regressors - I
Risk Quality Tier 1 Equity RoE CIR Liquid. Total Loans Tax Busi.
share asset
Risk 1.00 0.01 -0.15 -0.05 -0.33 0.03 -0.03 0.08 0.06 -0.14 0.21
Quality 0.01 1.00 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.10 -0.20 0.01 0.11
Tier 1 -0.15 -0.02 1.00 0.36 0.02 -0.38 0.02 -0.22 -0.21 -0.09 -0.14
Equity share -0.05 -0.11 0.36 1.00 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 -0.24 -0.14 -0.09 -0.04
RoE -0.33 0.01 0.02 0.00 1.00 -0.26 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.05
CIR 0.03 0.06 -0.38 -0.09 -0.26 1.00 -0.08 0.19 0.09 -0.06 0.26
Liquidity -0.03 0.13 0.02 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 1.00 -0.05 -0.12 0.10 -0.05
Total asset 0.08 0.10 -0.22 -0.24 -0.04 0.19 -0.05 1.00 0.87 -0.10 0.14
Loans 0.06 -0.20 -0.21 -0.14 0.00 0.09 -0.12 0.87 1.00 -0.07 0.03
Tax -0.14 0.01 -0.09 -0.09 -0.03 -0.06 0.10 -0.10 -0.07 1.00 -0.06
Business 0.21 0.11 -0.14 -0.04 0.05 0.26 -0.05 0.14 0.03 -0.06 1.00
CPD 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.13 0.13 -0.12 0.02
DUR 0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.05 -0.02 0.11 0.11 -0.09 0.02
GDP Rate -0.13 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.26 -0.07 -0.06 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 0.04
Index -0.06 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 -0.01
Short interest -0.08 0.09 -0.02 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.06 -0.09 -0.05 0.04 -0.02
Long interst -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.03 0.15 -0.04 0.00 -0.13 -0.10 0.09 -0.06
Volatility 0.13 0.10 0.02 -0.04 -0.17 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.06 -0.12 -0.06
MBR -0.17 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.30 -0.06 0.04 0.07 0.05 -0.01 0.10
33Table 17: Correlation matrix of regressors - II
CPD DUR GDP Index Short Long Vola MBR Cr Perf. Perf.
Rate inter. inter. spread AAA BBB
Risk 0.00 0.06 -0.13 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 0.13 -0.17 0.04 -0.06 -0.08
Quality -0.07 -0.10 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.18 -0.12 0.13 0.10
Tier 1 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Equity share -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.01
RoE -0.06 -0.10 0.26 0.07 0.18 0.15 -0.17 0.30 -0.09 0.08 0.09
CIR 0.04 0.05 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.05 -0.02 -0.03
Liquid. -0.05 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.01
Total asset 0.13 0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.09 -0.13 0.09 0.07 0.16 -0.12 -0.10
Loans 0.13 0.11 -0.15 -0.10 -0.05 -0.10 0.06 0.05 0.16 -0.12 -0.10
Tax -0.12 -0.09 -0.11 0.00 0.04 0.09 -0.12 -0.01 -0.14 0.08 0.08
Business 0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.04 -0.01 0.00
CPD 1.00 0.46 -0.18 0.32 -0.04 -0.25 -0.05 -0.04 0.76 -0.04 0.01
DUR 0.46 1.00 -0.39 -0.14 -0.32 -0.45 0.10 -0.16 0.87 -0.60 -0.66
GDP Rate -0.18 -0.39 1.00 0.35 0.31 0.34 -0.09 0.28 -0.35 0.46 0.43
Index 0.32 -0.14 0.35 1.00 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.20 0.09 0.34 0.36
Short interest -0.04 -0.32 0.31 0.05 1.00 0.80 0.09 0.26 -0.31 0.46 0.30
Long interest -0.25 -0.45 0.34 -0.01 0.80 1.00 0.07 0.19 -0.55 0.64 0.44
Volatility -0.05 0.10 -0.09 -0.05 0.09 0.07 1.00 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.15
MBR -0.04 -0.16 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.19 -0.04 1.00 -0.14 0.19 0.20
Credit risk spread 0.76 0.87 -0.35 0.09 -0.31 -0.55 0.02 -0.14 1.00 -0.58 -0.53
Performance AAA -0.04 -0.60 0.46 0.34 0.46 0.64 -0.07 0.19 -0.58 1.00 0.86
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